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We pay respects to their Elders past, present, and emerging. In particular, we
acknowledge the name and memory of Galmahra. We hope his story may be
told and remembered with the respect and understanding it deserves.
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Our History, Name, and Magazine
And now this is "an inheritance"-
Upright, rudimentary, unshiftably planked 
In the long ago, yet willable forward
Again and again and again.
-Seamus Heaney
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1911, the first academic year of this university, The Queensland University Magazine
was founded. A reader opened its pages to see an advertisement for New Zealand
Insurance Company Limited, Chas. Sankey Frazer, “refracting and general optician,”
and Jolliffe and Co.'s carriages. Only after these commercial necessities would a reader
hear the clarion call of the editorial and the staccato chronicling of university events.
For its first ten years, the quarterly magazine's efforts to build a university community
largely consisted in recording its goings-on. But amidst note-taking for the colleges
and keeping records of the Rifle Association’s Annual Meeting were traces of what
the magazine would become: its editorials were always stirring and a little beyond
the editors' capabilities, literary and cultural commentary were strewn throughout,
and it was never parochial. This is not to say it was well received. One dissatisfied
undergraduate in his letter to the editor wrote: “I feel it is my duty to protest against
the rottenness of the University Magazine. To read a university magazine should be a
pleasure, not a painful duty.” Complaints of undergraduate inadequacy would become
a recurrent feature of all issues from then on.
In May 1921, The Queensland University Magazine was rechristened
Calmahra. Under the editorships of Jack Lindsay, I. F. Jones, P. R. Stephenson, W. J.
Chamberlain and J. D. Fryer the magazine shifted from a demure, dutiful newsletter
to a forthright, unruly magazine. 1932 marked the birth of its younger sibling Semper
Floreat: “a students’ weekly newspaper.” Calmahra, now an annual, was emancipated
from recording the banal ephemera of everyday goings-on. From 1921-1968, Calmahra
would be a greenhouse for intellectual and literary talent. P. R. Stephenson would study
at Oxford, joining the Communist Party there alongside Graham Greene and A. J. P.
Taylor before befriending D. H. Lawrence and publishing a secret, uncensored edition
of Lady Chatterley's Lover. Eric Partridge would author Three Personal Records of the
War (a minor classic of war literature), Usage and Abusage, and Shakespeare’s Bawdy.
Fred Paterson would become Australia's first Communist Party MP in 1944. All three
wrote for Calmahra. Sir Harry Talbot Gibbs ended his 1937 editorial with a conclusion
suitable for a future Chief Justice of the High Court: “The editor’s ratiocination having
reached so felicitous a conclusion, he can smugly lay down his pen.” Thea Astley, David
Malouf, and Judith Wright all contributed their early poetry to Calmahra. Calmahra is
nothing less than the most significant undergraduate output of this university. And yet,
in 1968 following intermittent (albeit lively) volumes, Calmahra finally succumbed to
the old untiring hounds of financial pressures and undergraduate torpor.
Why, then, is this magazine not called Calmahra—what is sugarcane? It
is a difficult decision to abandon a title, especially a title under which so much good
writing has appeared. P. R. Stephenson, in the 1921 editorial, put forward the following
rationale for the adoption of Calmahra:
“Calmahra,” our final choice, is the Aboriginal name for a poet, seer, teacher, or
philosopher among the tribes. As it happens, it is also the name of a famous
figure in Australian history (...) the heroic “Jacky-Jacky” of the Kennedy Expedition
in 1848.
We have all admired those sterling qualities which led the intrepid native guide
to travel alone through hundreds of miles of unknown and hostile country till
finally he delivered his message to the rescuers on the relief-ship in the Gulf.
Courage, sagacity, initiative, devotion to duty, extraordinary physical powers
of endurance, these are the qualities of Galmahra, the last of the great heroes
amongst that primitive people that our cruelty and neglect has driven into servility
and degradation in the land which was their age-old heritage.
Stephenson’s recognition and condemnation of colonial “cruelty and neglect"
towards Indigenous Australians does not undo the denigrating language that precedes
■t- The name was used without the permission of Galmahra's family, or the permission
(or any recognition of) the Wonnarua nation. There was no attempt made to identify
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
which of the hundreds of Aboriginal language groups “Calmahra” belonged to. The
choice of title exposed Calmahra—a magazine edited by young, white men without fail
for its entire forty-seven-year history—to more cultural appropriation and inappropriate
celebrations of Calmahra as a hero of a race they denigrated as “primitive." The 1936
editorial states: “Thus Calmahra, the magazine, expresses the combined capacities of
our seers, our philosophers, our poets and our teachers, and so is one with that black
man who, many years ago, earned a lofty place in his tribe.” No magazine can be one
with a person, least so a man whom colonising Europeans renamed as “Jacky-Jacky;” a
de-individualising tag, which denies his cultural identity. No magazine should lay claim
to “qualities” necessitated, created, and articulated by colonialism. And no magazine
should perpetuate the colonial heroising of Calmahra that belies the tragedy of his
life—a tragedy lacking both details and indigenous sources. The man accompanied
an expedition: an episode of a practice that would see him and so many other First
Australians lose land, family, and life. Separated from his family and tribe and with only
a blanket in his possession, Calmahra died alone.1 His memory is not to be distorted,
but mourned.
Two things follow: first, Reader, in the inner-cover of this and every issue
you will find a recognition of the traditional custodians and of Calmahra. Second, a
new name is in order. We have chosen “sugarcane.” D. H. Lawrence was right: “All Art
partakes ofthe Spirit of the Place in which it is produced." The University ofQueensland
sits on the site of a nineteenth century sugar refinery sugar refinery, Couldridge Mill.
Owned by William John Dart, and commonly known as “Dart’s Mill," it was washed
away by the floods of 1893. Also, the word's appearance in George Herbert’s “The
Forerunners" provides us with an attractive inscription: “Lovely enchanting language,
sugar-cane.”
1. Blyton, Greg, Deirdre Heitmeyer and John Maynard. "Wannin thanbarran: A History
of Aboriginal and European Contact in Muswellbrook and the Upper Hunter Valley";
Australian Dictionary of Biography; Australian National Museum.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a new force in Queensland and the world, a force which is to push its
influences out in ever-widening circles and play a part in the development of
humankind—the Queensland University. We are that University, bound together
by ties of common loyalty, shared ideals, kindred aims. Our composite life has yet
been inarticulate, but by the laws of growth it cannot so remain, and these pages
mark its first attempt to find a voice and give utterance to its soul.'
Over one hundred years after the pealing declaration of this magazine’s
first editorial, and forty-nine years after its last issue ran, we open our revival with
its echo. That hopeful and earnest university community is no more. A “composite
life”—matchwood. The university, bounding forth during its youth to better humanity,
has sagged into an armchair and gestures vaguely over its paunch to “Create Change."
The university “soul” has been superseded by a brand.
What has happened to the idea of the University? Something has gone awry.
We have the sneaking suspicion that the University is not what it should be. Australian
universities were always, to some extent, devoted to the turning out of graduates into
the workplace. And yet we suspect employers once paid less attention to what was
studied—they cared only that their employees had studied. The University was simply
let alone. This is not the case today. Business—once indifferent to (perhaps bored
by)—the question of whether subjects studied could demonstrate direct economic
utility now take a feverish interest in it. So too do staff, and so too do many of our
fellow students. Asked to justify the humanities’ value in the neo-liberal economy—to
demonstrate their “impact”—humanists could not make their case to administrators
eloquently enough, in part because many were unsure of their own faith. Then again,
it may not have mattered had the case been more clearly put—we think convincing
justifications for the study of the humanities are not intelligible in the narrowly
utilitarian terms of neo-liberalism. And we see, in our curriculum and the absence of
any intellectual community, the consequences of this forced abdication of any defence
of the humanities' intrinsic worth.
What, then, is the value of the humanities that, we believe, was once
recognised and is now discarded? It is twofold: the (i) individual and (2) civic need for
knowledge. Reading books, watching films, and looking at art is an antidote to boredom.
We all have to spend a lot of time with ourselves—we might as well be interesting.
But we don’t simply study the humanities for distraction. There is also a civic value.
Democracy survives on a diet of ideas. If the humanities are marginalized and students 
are encouraged to study disciplines that can more easily demonstrate their economic
utility—if, as Auden has it, “Truth is replaced by Useful Knowledge”—then democracy
itself will wither away. Today, after decades of attacks on the humanities, engaged civic
society is under threat. Citizens in a democracy need to be what the Creeks called
parrhesiastes—those able to speak frankly and think critically about the forces that
attempt to shape them. And the best way, we argue, to train students to be able to
judge what they hear, read, and see—to reject spurious ideas in favour of true ones—is
to surround them with true ideas.
Ideally, this training would go on in the University. Presently, it does not.
We must resolve the paradox identified by Wendy Brown: “in order to support good
institutions, the people must antecedently be what only good institutions can make
them into." Our mission, and the mission of all who like to think, read, and write about
culture, must be to transform the University into a place that satisfies the individual
and civic needs for knowledge.
1. A. S. Fielding. "Editorial.” Queensland University Magazine, vol. no. 1911, p. 3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marvel: The Bad Dream of Postmodernism
Anne Teak
The Vogue photographs matter because they bring to mind-or stir up in us-the most
depressing of all suspicions we might have about modern art: the bad dream of
modernism
T.J. Clarke, "Jackson Pollock's Abstraction"1 
Post-modernism entails "the erosion of the older distinction between high culture and
so-called mass or popular culture. This is perhaps the most distressing development of
all from an academic standpoint" 
Fredrick Jameson, "Post Modernism and consumer society"2
If Jackson Pollock's paintings on the 1951 cover of Vogue marked the modernist’s “bad
dream”—that painting had become so pure, so abstract, so enigmatic that it was better used
as wallpaper—then QAGOMA’s exhibition Marvel: Creating the Cinematic Universe might just
be the postmodernist's nightmare. Since the collapse of Modernism in the 1960s artists
and, subsequently, art institutions have flirted with forms of mass culture: Warhol-made ads,
Lichtenstein-made comics, and Koons-made porn. This was a radical affront to the assertion
of art's autonomy and hinged on the fusion and confusion of art and the everyday. Isn’t this 
what we wanted? An art institution open to all forms of culture, high and low? But maybe,
like the Abstract Expressionist attempt to liberate art from the everyday (only to wind up
as decoration in a fashion magazine), post-modernist intentions have backfired. Because
removing the boundaries between high and low, academic and popular, avant-garde and
commercial doesn’t necessarily liberate art institutions. In fact, it may open museums up to
greater burdens.
So scared were we of art critics, white walls, and confusing jargon that we were
blinded to that other beast of ticket sales, attendance numbers, and Facebook likes. It’s a
hard question to ask, but have we really found emancipation through the end of highbrow
snootiness? Perhaps when art galleries were perceived as more exclusive they were also better
protected. Marvel: Creating the Cinematic Universe promises a blockbuster of blockbusters. I
don’t point this out simply for word play. The tautology signifies a perpetual cycle that can
trap even the best museums.
Marvel: Creating the Cinematic Universe is the first exhibition in the world to
be produced with the support of Marvel Studios. It features some original comics but
mostly costumes and props from the Disney Marvel films. Thor, Spiderman, and Iron
Man will cover the walls of the first floor of GOMA; notably, half the space given to the
Cindy Sherman exhibition in 2016 and the forthcoming Gerhard Richter survey this year.
GOMA’s Cinematheque (usually reserved for foreign films, the Golden Hollywood era, and
independents) will also run a series of Marvel movies. So why is Marvel not art? It is not
a question I can satisfactorily answer beyond stating my personal convictions. The more
important question is why showing Marvel in QAGOMA is neither in the Gallery's nor the
public’s interests.
While this exhibition might seem original, there are precedents for the museum­
entertainment symbiosis. In 2002, the Brooklyn Museum staged Star Wars: The Magic of 
Myth, which (with uncanny similarity) displayed the models and sketches of the Star Wars
films. As one might expect from Marvel, these objects were not shown in a scientific or critical 
way but, as New York Times critic Michael Kimmelman put it, like “holy relics” of the filmic
enterprise.3 This clearly marks the way for QAGOMA’s next child-friendly exhibition, but I
can’t help feeling there is more at risk in this iteration. The New York museum already held
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the privilege of an established audience. Theirs was a project in expanding, not forming, an
interested public. Only having just celebrated its io,h anniversary, GOMA is in a very different
position. .
The Gallery faces a difficult problem: in ordertoget greater visitor numbers and to
increase funding they must cater beyond the art niche; yet, to continue to put on art exhibitions
they must foster a community that is willing to experience something outside of popular
culture. In other words, Marvel: Creating the Cinematic Universe may bring in large numbers,
but does this mean that to maintain these figures the same sort of show must be repeated,
year after year? Looking at it this way, it seems that the only future for a state-funded gallery
is failure. Whether this is financial failure or failure to exhibit art, either way the institution
collapses. For me, the saddest part of this popular turn isn’t that “fine art” is denied its
rightful place in the white cube, or even that fewer emerging artists from Australia and the
Asia Pacific will be exhibited. At its core, such decisions assume that good art, conceptual
or beautiful art, is somehow inaccessible to those outside of the art world. On the surface,
the Marvel exhibition might seem a triumph to the average, tax-paying citizen (despite being
ticketed, and ten dollars more than usual), but to believe this is to believe, crudely put, that
regular people don’t understand art.
As I write this, there are examples in GOMA’s current collection exhibition Sugar
Spin that disprove such unspoken assumptions. Anthony McCall’s large-scale light sculpture,
Crossing (2016), is a highly ephemeral and conceptual artwork. Created in a darkened room
with smoke and projections, McCall creates intersecting cones of light that take on a
deceptively dense and tangible presence. At once sculptural and permeable, the work allows
the viewer to think on the porous nature of other seemingly solid materials, including our
own bodies. You do not need a degree, knowledge of post-minimal art, or even to have read
the didactic panel to understand this. All you need is to enter the space and thread your
hands through the light. Another great work, by Melia Jarrsma, hi islander (1999) explores
race relations in post-colonial Indonesia through the remaking of hijabs in animal skins. But
this does not stop it from being an alluring, fairy-tale vision of stitched frog skins and chicken
feet that children are immediately drawn to. Contemporary art is full of such examples: good
not because they deal with theoretical problems but because they bring these problems into
understanding.
Ironically, as Marvel: Creating the Cinematic Universe brings the public closer and
closer towards the gallery it distances it further than ever from art. The problem with shows
like Marvel is that they presume what “the masses” want, or rather, what they don’t want. In
the postmodernist’s bad dream she finally realises that the collapse of high and low culture
did not undo the tangled knot of assumptions surrounding the public. Among the museum’s
ruins high-profile corporations find their feeding ground. We don’t wake up to a utopia in
which art has been entirely extricated from institutional power; we are in a nightmare where
what is shown—and what the people are told they like—is at the determination of the highest
bidder.
1. T. J. Clarke, “Jackson Pollock's Abstraction,” in Reconstructing modernism: new approaches,
ed. KirkVarnedoe. (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1999), 172-231.
2. Fredrick Jameson, “Post Modernism and consumer society,” in The anti-aesthetic; essays on
postmodern culture, ed. Hal Foster (New York: New Press, 2002), 127-144.
3. Michael Kimmelman, “The ‘Star Wars’ Effect, And the Part That’s Art” The New York Times,
April 5, 2002.
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We all have demons. 1996 saw Prime Minister John Howard introduce us to a new kind of
demon: “illegal” refugees. Unlike those before who arrived on boats, fleeing persecution, these
new “illegals” were “queue-jumpers.” Since this fateful rhetoric entered public discourse in
1996, immigration has become one of the most hotly contended of popular political debates.
Explicit cultural anxieties surround the imagined guileful intruder who deliberately arrives in
Australia without documentation to evade discovery. In reality, however, the new and elusive
Australian dream for those seeking refuge is the promise of permanency: a passport proving
one’s legitimate place in Australia.
Passports seek to confirm nationality and identity—they validate one’s existence
in an era of geopolitical crisis. It is in the pages of the passport that contemporary social
and political identities are written. In Afghani-Australian artist Khadim Ali’s The Arrivals #4
(2016) watercolour, gouache, and gold leaf are combined to provide a nuanced vision of
immigration in the twenty-first century. Ali has painstakingly enlarged the minute visual codes
seen on passport pages, creating intricate patterns coded with transnational meanings. At
the top of the work eucalyptus leaves and flowers are rendered in a pattern of tightly bound
blue circles—in the top right, mimicking the purposefully unreproducible visual cyphers
of passports, is a lizard whose dark grey-blue body is dissected by expanding concentric
circles.
Along the left edge is a seemingly infinite, slightly curved field of text: DEPORT
DEPORT DEPORT DEPORT. There is rich irony in Ali’s replacing of the legitimising word—
"passport"—with a word that signals a verdict of illegitimacy—“deport.” In fact, Ali’s
large-scale passport page thrives on the tensions between legitimacy and illegitimacy, and
citizenship and statelessness. The visual codes that adorn passports as marks of legitimate
documentation—like the heterogeneous patterns on physical currency—are contrasted with
the more figurative scene painted into the foreground. Ifthe passport’s visual codes are signals
of legitimacy, then the visual insurgency of the six benevolent demons is communicated to us 
as an illegitimate presence in the visual field. It is for its legitimising security that the passport
has become the new Australian dream.
Those fleeing political and environmental terrors are demonised in the Australian
political arena: a situation presented by Khadim Ali’s benevolent demon figures at the centre
of The Arrivals #4. Forced to flee from the demons of a country or region in crisis, asylum
seekers and refugees are doubly tormented: they are forced to flee from demons, and in doing
so are themselves demonised. Intricately painted atop the passport page, the expressions
of Ali’s six bearded demons are docile and contemplative. Two kneeling figures console a
third fallen figure, whose body rests on a patch of vegetation. They gently tend to the supine
demon whose angelic wings, unlike those watching over, appear to have fallen. Behind these
shirtless brown-skinned figures stand three blue demons. Their bodies materialise from an
ether of pale gouache and they stand looking down at the scene below. The prostrate and
wingless demon resting on the bed of foliage is daydreaming after a long and tumultuous
journey and remembering those lost along the way. The surrounding winged spirits don’t
haunt the resting figure, they watch over him. The two other brown figures kneeling beside
him speak to lives lost—lost to the persecutions that caused him to flee, the ordeal of fleeing
itself, and indefinite detention. The blue demons more overtly allude to other spiritual planes
through their colour—ancestral and spiritual guardians.
Yet these demons present no malevolent threat. They are gentle, refuting claims
of terror. As the print of the page seeps through parts of the demons, fusing them with the
document, they become Australian. Floating above them is an elliptical cloud of red hand-
scribed Arabic characters, weaving amongst the surrounding gum leaves. Today the pervasive
fear of Islamic fundamentalists has poisoned Western visions of all Arabic culture, but in The
Arrivals #4 Khadim Ali has subtly suggested unity: the red Arabic script weaves amongst blue
and yellow-gold gum leaves. The formal utilisation of the unity and cohesion of the primary
colours here suggests a coming together of cultures, a peaceful place where our wing-less
demons can rest and be at ease.
Cheese is Made from Milk. Get it?
Damian Maher
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 9 2006, the corner of Hollywood Boulevard and La Brea. Two young men film a
man with a dollop of whipped cream for hair and Georgia, a cow. Behind Georgia stands a
poster: “WITHOUT CHEESE THERE WOULDN’T BE AN INLAND EMPIRE." The bolder of
the young men asks what the signs means. David Lynch answers in his unaffected twang:
“Cheese is made from milk. Get it?" As they leave one of the young men says, “Man, this is
so Lynchian.”
What does he mean by that? Is “Lynchian” merely synonymous with “weird"? But
in Lynch’s insouciance and Georgia’s presence there exists the collocation of the mundane
and the strange. And as Lynch’s bovine corner-squatting was actually a publicity drive to
promote Laura Dern for an Academy Award you have what many experience as irony. All
of which seems to neatly align with the most thoughtful definition of Lynchian I have come
across:
Lynchian refers to a particular kind of irony where the very macabre and the very
mundane combine in such a way as to reveal the former’s perpetual containment within
the latter. But like postmodern or pornographic, Lynchian is one of those Porter-Stewart
type words that’s ultimately definable only ostensibly—i.e. we know it when we see it.' 
David Foster Wallace wrote those words in 1996 and although I largely disagree
with him—I don’t believe Lynch’s oeuvre, including the bovine campaign for Oscar glory, is
laden with irony—I think he is right on two points. The first is the implication that the written
word is wholly unsuited to wrestling into submission and exhibiting in a syntactical cage the
sensory beast dubbed “Lynchian.” (Knowing no other means I will use these impotent tools.)
The second is that he avoids the trap of describing images or objects as Lynchian in and of
themselves. Red curtains, crimson lips, fire, super-imposed faces, a spotlit stage, blown-out
brains, a highway at night, a factory, a blue box, and as of 2017 an empty glass box encircled
by cameras. All motifs for which Lynch is renowned, but they are synecdoches at best. A
few metres of red fabric are ubiquitous—they hang before every stage and movie screen. 
Highways crisscross America, Lumbertons dot those sad old states no-one can fill in on a
map, and the blue box is empty. But they become revered, puzzled over, and feared when
filled to the brim with Lynchian coffee.
Where is the ecstasy in Wallace’s definition? Wallace was invited onto the set
of Lost Highway. In that film, a Hitchcockian blonde slides out of a black Cadillac. She is
the doppelganger of a murdered woman—familiar enough for Twin Peaks’ voyeurs. Yet
she casts an alluring, brief glance at a mechanic. She turns back to look again, eyes gelid,
an unconscious recognition stirring deep within them. The mechanic is the husband and
convicted killer of the blonde’s doppelganger metamorphosed. Lou Reed drawls: “This magic
moment / So Different and So new I was like any other.” And isn’t that a brilliant summation
of a Lynchian moment’s indicators: magical, unique, yet like any other. But recognising does
not lessen, indeed it may even amplify, the moment’s reverberation. It is as if we had been
clinging to a dark, thin ribbon of reality, only for Lynch to twist the ribbon from our grasp.
Lynch’s plots are often Mobius strips: bounded in a simple closed curve, yet requiring a
180-degree twist. The twist is dizzying and dilating. It is awful and full of awe. This is not the
banal, but its banishing.
Wild at Heart ends with Sailor Ripley (Nicolas Cage) clambering over cars as
the strings of Richard Strauss’ “Vier Letzte Lieder” reach a nauseating level of romantic
earnestness. As Sailor leaps atop Lula Pace Fortune’s (Laura Dern) car and wrenches her
into his arms, the strings evaporate as Sailor proposes to Laura by singing Elvis’ “Love Me
Tender.” The moment is so 80s, credits even roll past the crooning Nick Cage that it is easy
to understand why many label this as parody. Roger Ebert casts Lynch as a “clever con-man"
using "exploitation, put-on and self-satire,” but it’s a miscast. Lynch is a creator that sincerely
revels in these moments with an almost child-like wonder. Some may call it jejune. The wafer-
thin distinction between the two—and the tendency of viewers to hop ditheringly from one
side to the other—is the source of the difficulty in determining whether Lynch is a genius or
an idiot. It may be a bit late to declare my allegiance this far into a vichyssoise aspiring to be
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a consommd. Yes, the characters are envious and psychotic, the plot a monstrous absurdity,
and their love a dangerous, sexual flame but this finale is sweet. In Lynch’s own words: "I like
darkness and confusion and absurdity, but I like to know that there could be a little door that
you could go out into a safe life area of happiness.” What’s wonderful about Wild at Heart
is we enter and leave through the same little Elvis-esque door. The film opens with Sailor
staggering to his feet after smashing a man’s brains out across a marble floor, cigarette
dangling from his lips, and performs Elvis’ finger-point. The film closes with Cage’s Elvisian
drawl, quiff, and hip-swinging swagger showing us through the little door to happiness. The
film is wild at heart, but that heart is tender and true.
Wallace's definition captures only that component of Lynchian that Tarantino
seems to have absorbed, slickened, and popularised. (Just consider a scene from Lost
Highway that seems like classic Tarantino: a driver tailgates Mr Eddy. Mr Eddy then proceeds
to almost run the driver off a cliff, beat him to a pulp with a gun all while lecturing him on
the dangers of tailgating.) David Foster Wallace’s aphorism is perfect: “Quentin Tarantino is
interested in watching somebody’s ear getting cut off; David Lynch is interested in the ear.’’2
Just as Lynch has his artistic roots in surrealism (only compare the crawling ants
of Luis Bufiuel and Salvador Dali to those of Blue Velvet), Lynchian has its etymological roots
in Andr£ Breton’s definition of surrealism: “Surrealism is based on the belief in the superior
reality of certain forms of association heretofore neglected, in the omnipotence of dreams
[...] I believe in the future resolution of the states of dream and reality, in appearance so 
contradictory, in a sort of absolute reality, or surreality.”3 The future resolution has become
the present resolution in the works of Lynch. Unlike the work of other surrealist directors
(whenever anyone says this a reflex gesture to Luis Bunuel is impossible to suppress) Lynch’s
work does not solely exist in a clearly oneiric world. His worlds—Reaganite small-town
Americana or an early 2000s slick and greasy L.A.—often look very much like ours. Lynch
doesn’t allow us to withdraw to the safe ironic distance that deadens the impact of pure 
surrealism.
Lynchian is that uncanny feeling that arises not from the opposition of the familiar
to the unfamiliar, the normal to the strange, reality to the dream, but from the epiphany that
reveal them to be one and the same. The brilliance of Blue Velvet's opening lies not in its
uncovering the crawling, entomic underbelly of an ordinary small-town—real America—but
in showing that town to be just as dream-like as the Black and White Lodges. A Dalmatian
sits next to a waving man on a fire engine, variously ribboned and pigtailed children cross the
road under the angelic guardianship of a beckoning lollypop lady, and red roses and yellow
tulips blow against blindingly white fences. This isn’t real: Lynch is sending us postcards from
a place that couldn’t exist. But even more entrancing is when a dream morphs into an even
stranger reality. Cooper’s reverse time-reversed dream shudders and rolls into the small town
ofTwin Peaks.
Hiding and revealing, red curtains serve as a reminder as to how the Lynchian is
so pervasive and deep-seated in the collective psyche: voyeurism. All films are voyeuristic but
Lynch’s films and his best work plays explicitly to the voyeur; it makes us uncomfortable for
even committing the act of watching, yet the film crooks its finger, beckoning us to press our
eye closer to the keyhole. From the closet, Jeffrey Beaumont watches Frank Booth sexually
assault Dorothy Vallens: he calls her mommy and alternatively refers to himself as daddy and
baby saying he wants to fuck all the while inhaling gas. Frank punches Vallens screaming:
"DON’T YOU FUCKING LOOK AT ME.” But Jeffrey is still looking, as are we. And we cannot
possibly look away because as strong as the repulsion is, the attraction is stronger. Lynch
eases us in by providing us with the reassurance that we are simply looking to see what Jeffrey
sees. But in later scenes when it is Jeffrey who punches Vallens or when a lipstick-smeared
Frank screams at Jeffrey “DON'T YOU FUCKING LOOK AT ME,” there can be no such
reassurance. We are the only voyeur remaining. We are the “you” Frank yells at to stop fucking
looking because we are still looking. We are the ones entranced by a prostitute dancing on the
roof of a car to Roy Orbison’s "In Dreams” while a red-lipped Frank torments and beats the
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
baby-faced Jeffrey. It’s our very own peepshow. It’s why Lynchian moments are so addictive:
this vision that even the most hygienic, generic of locales can be so twisted, so seedy, so 
fucked up is enslaving. Pauline Kael’s overheard remark in her review of Blue Velvet pithily
sums it up: “Maybe I’m sick, but I want to see that again.” There is something sick in this
facet of the Lynchian. It repeatedly manifests itself in misogynistic spirals, rapist fantasies,
or slapstick violence and as the vanilla, pure, small-town Jeffrey starts to enact these, so do
we start to recognise something of ourselves in these terrible acts. A darkness resides inside
each of us. That we watch and we enjoy seems only to confirm it.
But if Lynch beckons the voyeur then what the hell is The Rabbits doing? In the
online films The Rabbits, which Wikipedia unblinkingly describes as “short horror comedies,”
three characters play out a sitcom in a single box set with a laugh track. The three characters
are humanoid rabbits that speak in unrelated sentences to which a laugh track bellows out
seemingly at random. The most familiar of laugh tracks becomes ghoulish; the classic sit­
com entrance becomes ominous.
This playing on the familiar is what lacks in Inland Empire. The film is laden with
Lynch’s motifs, yet the power is wanting because the familiar is absent. There is no time for 
us to press our noses to the window. We are able to achieve that safe, smug distance. The
film becomes a mere object of curiosity rather than a looming or awe-inspiring feat. Wallace
again:
That is, if we know on some level what a movie wants from us, we can erect certain
internal defences that let us choose how much of ourselves to give away to it. The
absence of point or recognisable agenda in Lynch’s films, though, strips these subliminal
defences and lets Lynch get inside your head in a way movies normally don’t. This is why
his best films’ effects are so often so emotional and nightmarish. (We’re defenceless in
our dreams too.)1 234
1. David Foster Wallace “David Lynch Keeps his Head," in A Supposedly Fun Thing I'll Never
do Again: Essays and Arguments (New York: Back Bay Books, 1998), 161.
2. David Foster Wallace “David Lynch Keeps his Head,” in A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never do
Again: Essays and Arguments (New York: Back Bay Books, 1998), 166.
3. Quoted in Fred S. Kleiner, ed., Gardner’s Art Through the Ages: A Global History (Boston:
Wadsworth: 2013), 875.
4. David Foster Wallace “David Lynch Keeps his Head," in A Supposedly Fun Thing I'll Never do
Again: Essays and Arguments (New York: Back Bay Books, 1998), 171.
5. David Lynch, interviewed by David Stratton, David Lynch In Conversation: Presented by
QAGOMA, 14 March 2015.
Defenceless. Defenceless is an excellent way to describe facing the Lynchian.
I may know it; I may have seen it and I may even have been able to define it. But I will
never be immune to it. As the gum we like comes back in style and we sit down to watch
Twin Peaks Season 3, I know that defining the Lynchian evacuates neither its power nor its
unpredictability. In Twin Peaks: Fire Walk With Me Agent Phillip Jeffries (who in possibly the
most fitting casting choice ever is played by David Bowie) says: “We live inside a dream."
David Stratton in an interview with Lynch called this “a very Lynchian idea” to which Lynch
responded: “Well, it's sorta the truth.’’5 And perhaps this explains, “Cheese is made from 
milk.” It’s not Lynchian, it’s just sorta the truth.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"AUGUST LILLIES"
Nick Van Buuren
So many brought lilies
Arranged white for the kitchen
Propped up in vases
They spilt over
Into jugs and milk cartons. 
Anything that held
Water those went as
Stems lay 'cross mantel tops 
Necks pressed between sheets.
They fell back on cracked 
Dinner voices refracted
Through glass forests
Petals fell in meals
Tasted like a butcher in the
Florist's shop sweet waves
Of nectar fibre
Before the bleached nausea
Intoxicated
Anther's dusty prints
Carpel's greasy ovule streaks 
Dustpans and tissues
To collect fallen
Lilies, growing from damp corners
Unfurling in the drains.
Noise became
A tremor on the edge
Of a lily's leaf.
We left her lilies
Listening for the thunder 
Of petals falling.
 
 
 
Torry Atkin
Dancing is a man's game, he says, 
and if he does it well, he does it better 
than a woman. Yet gaily he whistles, 
a brolly over his shoulder—a man 
who sings, dances, and directs—a man 
who splashes through history on a high fever—a man
who, in a sailor's blue stripes,
beats out a big-brass rhythm, his thighs
firing beneath ivory slacks—ah men, amen!
Who could ask for anything more?
—maybe I 
who dreamed of being the next Gene Kelly—maybe I 
who clung to street lamps 
in my grandmother's skirts—maybe I 
who watched mountains on telly, horns and strings 
rising and rising (they're lying) like lovers 
to meet Julie, a figure fit for fields, 
spinning, arms open: "I know I will hear 
what I've heard before," she says as she yields her voice 
to me, to Gene, to everyone.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matthew Arnold first famously recommended a “disinterested” literary criticism in that
much controverted (not to say scorned) and lauded (not to say worshipped) essay “The
Function of Criticism at the Present Time” (1865). “How", asked Arnold, “is criticism to show
disinterestedness?” His answer was:
By keeping aloof from what is called “the practical view ofthings"; by resolutely following
the law of its own nature, which is to be a free play of the mind on all subjects which
it touches. By steadily refusing to lend itself to any of those ulterior, political, practical
considerations about ideas, which plenty of people will be sure to attach to them, which
perhaps ought often to be attached to them, which in this country at any rate are certain 
to be attached to them quite sufficiently, but which criticism has really nothing to do 
with. Its business is, as I have said, simply to know the best that is known and thought
in the world, and by in its turn making this known, to create a current of true and fresh
ideas. (...) [Criticism's] course is determined for it by the idea which is the law of its
being: the idea of a disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known
and thought in the world, and thus to establish a current of fresh and true ideas.
To exercise a “free play of the mind on all subjects which it touches”; “to learn
and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world”; “to establish a current of
fresh and true ideas”: What is the contemporary critic to do with such startlingly confident,
and yet so curiously vague, declarations of his or her function? He or she may be tempted—
probably trained—to treat the concept of disinterestedness as a literary critical “theory"—as
a worked-through and logically coherent system. I don't think Arnold's concept stands such
treatment. Is it then useless? No—not if disinterestedness is understood instead as a critical
“approach” or, in Arnold’s phrase, a “temper of mind” suitable to the literary critic. This
conception of disinterestedness—as an approach rather than a theory—is indispensable to
contemporary critical practice.
But can criticism be un-theoretical? Christopher Ricks has said that a critic
"either has a theory or he has caprices." Certainly disinterestedness has often been taken
as Arnold’s “theoretical" assertion that critical objectivity is possible and necessary. Some
“objectivists”—who, like E. D. Hirsch Jr, consider objective and impartial judgment possible
in literary criticism—have defended disinterestedness against “relativists” like Barbara
Herrnstein Smith, who argues that literary value is always contingent and the criteria of
criticism never absolute.
Hirsch understands disinterestedness as a statement of the possibility of
suspending ideology. When Arnold recommends, in his famous phrase, we look at the object,
“as in itself it really is", Hirsch points out the extrinsic criteria of this evaluative theory: the
literary object is judged in terms of its value in relation to other literary objects. The relativist
objection is well known: what if two equally learned and patient critics disagree on what
“the object as in itself it really is” is? Such disagreement would suggest our judgments of
literary works reflect only the value those works hold for us in a particular time and place. This
argument was classically put by Herrnstein Smith: “no matter how magisterially delivered and
with what attendant claims or convictions of universality, unconditionality, impersonality, or
objectivity, any assertion of‘the value’ of some object can always be unpacked as a judgment
of its contingent value."
Objectivists and relativists: theirs is the most interminable squabble in
philosophy. A more interesting case, perhaps, are those committed "objectivists” who yet
reject disinterestedness as an inadequate statement of objectivity (like T. S. Eliot and F.
R. Leavis). “Disinterestedness” was for Eliot all too urbane an ideal—it had a "somewhat
unctuous, almost genteel, even anaemic air about it’”; Eliot’s aversion here resembles Walt
Whitman’s, who characterised Arnold as the general of that “great army of critics, parlor
apostles, worshippers of hangings, laces, and so forth and so forth [who] never have anything
properly at first hand.” But Eliot’s objection was at bottom a religious prejudice: the merely
disinterested critic, lacking any orthodox religious conviction (and perhaps professing a
faith in a vague and middle-class “Culture”) could not, thought Eliot, “see beneath both
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
beauty and ugliness; to see the boredom, and the horror, and the glory.” Leavis, on the other
hand, could not endorse what he perceived as the lack in Arnold’s work of “any very taut
or subtle development of an argument or any rigour of definition." And both agreed that,
as the Australian critic George Watson trenchantly put it, “to enjoin and encourage men to
be critical is no more like being a good critic oneself than to urge men to be good is to be
a serious contributor to the study of ethics”. So for Leavis, Arnold was, at best, engaged in
“higher pamphleteering"; for Eliot he was more “a propagandist for criticism than a critic."
The contemporary Marxist critic Terry Eagleton also sees Arnold as a
propagandist: not for “criticism” but for “a covertly doctrinaire conservatism.”2 Eagleton
presumes the possibility of disinterested assessment but urges its avoidance; his attack
on disinterestedness is all the more ferocious because he thinks it dangerously realisable.
“Disinterestedness,” under Eagleton’s lens, entails an indefensible political detachment from 
literature. The sage-critic, withdrawn from “the social arena to less contaminated heights”,
lapses into "ineffectual idealism.”3 Ensconced in the ivory tower, the critic cannot make out
anything below his serene heights very clearly; “the universal view,” as the French-Romanian
philosopher E. M. Cioran once wrote, “melts everything into a blur." Motivated by a kind of
“Indian detachment,”4 criticism thus obtains its content by a continual denial of “political,
practical considerations.’’5 Meanwhile the masses, taught to suspend their “petty material
preoccupations with rank, class, power, gender, ethnicity, [and] social inequality”6 by reading
literature, are rehearsed in the “habits of pluralistic thought”7 and end up incorporated and
pacified. And so "any appeals to see the object as it really is can be decoded as invitations
to see it as our rulers do.’’8 Disinterestedness renders both the critics and working classes
politically ineffectual: the critic, divorcing theoria from praxis, evades his social duties and the
workers’ revolutionary ambitions are tranquilized.
But Eagleton is ungenerous to Arnold, who was familiar with the charge of
irresponsible disinterestedness in his own time: ‘“Death, sin, cruelty stalk among us, filling
their maws with innocence and youth,’ and me, in the midst of the general tribulation, handing
out my pouncet-box,”9 and who, at the very least, provided Eagleton with the title of his book
The Function of Criticism. And Arnold was not the sort of aloof yogi-critic Eagleton makes him
out to have been—he was an extraordinarily active Inspector of Schools, sometimes visiting
over 200 institutions a year, and an eloquent and tireless advocate for public education
reform. Recognising that Arnold was anything but withdrawn and marginal, E. K. Brown
makes a subtler objection than Eagleton: Arnold betrayed his own ideal of disinterestedness
for "practical criticism” because
In the end a man who has seen things as they really are, will add doing to his seeing; or if
the enterprise oftryingto see things as they really are turns out to be extremely long and
difficult, the man of culture will impart to his pupils and his sons, to the next generation,
the outcome of his observations and reflections; and in consequence of his illuminating
communications they will act.'°
Of course, it is a good divine that follows his own instructions." But both Eagleton
and Brown have misread “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time.” Arnold does not
mean a disinterested critic cannot hold political, religious, or moral values, or that there
should not exist any relation between the critic’s values and the objects of his or her criticism.
As Stefan Collini observes: “‘Disinterested’ does not, it ought to be unnecessary to say, mean
‘uninterested.”’ The banishment of “ulterior considerations” from the realm of criticism
is nothing so drastic: “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time” rather recommends
we “wear our cloak a little more loosely"; that we cultivate, as Arnold wrote elsewhere, an
“openness of mind and flexibility of intelligence.”'2 This is not the escapism of, say, the New 
Criticism, with its shamelessly anti-social devotion to the "words on the page” and disregard
for everything off it. With Arnold, we are "to forget the pressure of practical considerations
a little.” This is the change in intellectual mood Arnold was really trying to effect, and it was
aimed especially at “the organs of men and parties having practical ends to serve.” In his
poem "Absence”, Arnold mourned how “each day brings its petty dust / Our soon-choked
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
souls to fill.” This is all Arnold asks: that we take some time to brush off the intellectual dust
of the moment—that we take a step back, catch our breath, collect ourselves. Then, more
presentable—more focussed—we can re-enter “daily living with spirits restored."'3
This might seem rather a loose way of talking about a coherent and systematic
theory of critical objectivity. But Arnold’s “disinterestedness” is not that; it is something
more humble and practical than a theory: it is a strategy, an approach, a way of “inhabiting
one’s identity,’”4 of “possessing one’s experience,”'5 an intellectual “disposition,”'6 or “cast
of mind.”'7What has been written of Erasmus’s philosophy is applicable to Arnold’s thought
also: “This sort of philosophy is rather a matter of disposition than of syllogisms, rather of
lie than of disputation, rather of inspiration than of erudition, rather of transformation than
of logic.”'8
Certainly Arnold himself despised “theory": “The systematic judgment [...] is
the most worthless judgment of all. Its author has not really his eye upon the professed
object of criticism at all, but upon something else which he wants to prove by means of
that object. [...] He is no genuine critic, but a man with a system, an advocate.” To realise
that “disinterestedness” is not intended as an epistemological claim about the way in which
critics can “know" a literary work, but instead as a critical attitude or stance, is to fit the
concept coherently into Arnold’s broader thought. Everywhere in his work one finds the
same nervousness about system-builders: “I have never been able to hit it off very well with
the logicians, and it would be mere affectations in me to give myself the airs of doing so.
They imagine truth something to be proven, I something to be seen; they something to be
manufactured, I as something to be found.” The worst critical sin was, for Arnold, to be
“carried away by a turn for broad generalisation" and so to “forget that the world is not
all of one piece, and every piece with the same needs at the same time.” As an approach,
disinterestedness, then, involves the recognition that the function of criticism is determined
by the needs of different ages and cultures. In this way, the disinterested critic, impartial to
present tastes and so saved from the provinciality of the present, resembles the historical
relativist. But in “emphasisjing] what his countrymen neglect, [and] exaltjing] what they
depreciate,”'9 the critic remains true to what Hirsch calls the "absolute principle of balance"—
or, as Arnold casually put it, pre-occupied with “the lumber of phrases we learnt at Oxford
from Aristotle, about virtue being in a mean.”
What Howard Jacobson said of F. R. Leavis must be our attitude to Arnold: “What
he saw was highly idiosyncratic: we cannot see that way again.” The great critical assaults on
objectivity and impartiality in the past half-century must be accounted for in our appraisal
of “disinterestedness.” We cannot mourn, as Arnold sometimes allowed himself to do in
his poetry, for the time “when wits were fresh and clear, / And life ran gaily as the sparkling
Thames: Before this strange disease of modern life, / With its sick hurry, its divided aims, / Its
heads o’er taxed, its palsied hearts, was rife.”20 If our wits today are rather less than clear it is
because we have left the "sparkling Thames” for deeper intellectual waters.
Arnold always claimed he was a man with no philosophy, no system. And “from a
man without a philosophy,"Arnold wrote, “no onecan expect philosophical completeness.” But
doesn’t Arnold only show his philosophy by denying he has one? For Cioran, non-ideological
thought was impossible: “Man is the dogmatic being par excellence; and his dogmas are all
the deeper when he does not formulate them, and when he is unaware of them, and when he
follows them." Dogmatism, for Cioran, is inevitable and all dogmas inevitably destructive—a
disinterested critic, in love with his objectivity, will be a fanatic of disinterestedness. Similarly,
Slavoj Zizek detects in neo-liberal capitalism an “ideological disidentification"—that is,
the process by which the subject is permitted to feel a (false) distance towards ideology’s
explicit prescriptions. The division of ideas into the “ideological" and the "pragmatic” is
familiar. Margaret Thatcher’s declaration that “There Is No Alternative,” Francis Fukuyama’s
announcement of "The End of History,” the Australian characterisation of market de-regulation
as "economic rationalism”—these “post-politjcal” pronouncements deny the possibility of
radical change by asserting the inevitability and inherent reasonableness of the neo-liberal
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regime. Porky Pig is the regime’s mascot: We might make some few improvements—a
higher standard of living, even freer trade agreements—but That’s All Folks! At once arrogant
and evasive, this attitude doesn’t own up to its ideological ideals. And Zizek recognises
that “even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironic distance, we are still
doing them." The critic, then, cannot hope to escape from ideology or wake up from Cioran's
“sommeil dogmatique.” And disinterested criticism is just as dogmatique as a more explicitly
ideological critical approach (for instance, Marxist theory)—perhaps more so for denying its
own dogmatic claims. For critics of the post-political consensus like Zizek, Arnold’s ideal is
exasperatingly un-ideological; “disinterestedness” is for them what nihilists are for Walter
in The Big Lebowski: “Nihilists! Fuck me... say what you want about the tenets of National
Socialism, Dude, at least it’s an ethos." At least, such critics argue, Marxist, or psychoanalytic,
or feminist, or liberal theory are theories—“disinterestedness," understood as an approach,
seems naively inadequate. •
Arnold’s “disinterestedness,” however, does not deserve such opprobrium. “Free
play of the mind," “the best that has been thought and said," "seeing the object as in itself
it really is”—this "frippery of phrases” (as Arnold himself once called them) is really only an
exhortation to be intellectually curious and flexible. And isn’t it true that everyone who likes to
think about literature does so, to lesser or greater degrees, curiously, meditatively, and so in
some sense “disinterestedly”? Isn’t a measure of disinterestedness required to read literature
at all? How otherwise could a committed Marxist enjoy Wodehouse, or a conservative Shelley
or Blake? The opposite of Coleridge’s “suspension of disbelief’—the suspension of belief-
must also be possible. Why, then, should Arnold’s description and recommendation of this
intellectual experience be treated as a “dogma”? The answer must be: Because description
is always assertion and an anti-dogmatic dogma still a dogma. But Arnold never called
“disinterestedness” a dogma—it was only a "temper of mind,” an attitude to be cultivated.
Which is exactly what a dogmatist would say, is the inevitable comeback. In response I can
only plead that the disinterested critic—practicing a dialectical movement of mind—is not
the “ideologically disidentified” subject of the “post-political.” The disinterested critic retains
the ability to think impartially even when she belongs to a party; she refuses to follow Walter
Benjamin’s fifth thesis for critical technique—that “'Objectivity' must always be sacrificed to
partisanship, if the cause fought for merits this”—because she recognises that the nature of a
cause will change, and with it the reasons for fighting for it. The disinterested critic will subject
her ideological commitments, then, to continual justification and re-examination. Lenin, in
What Is To Be Done?, called such self-assessment “eclecticism and lack of principle." It is not
that: the disinterested critic may have convictions, but they must not be followed or acquired
slavishly. He mustn’t delude himself into thinking he is some knight-critic, astride the steed of
Ideology, slaying other dogmas in the war of ideas. And yet, of course, sometimes ideas really
are irreconcilable; sometimes there really is a war of ideas. In which case, “disinterestedness"
is valuable as a strategy: the critic must be able to disinterestedly imagine how he would think
and act were he in the enemy’s position. The disinterested critic is not un-ideological: the
smug complacency of the person convinced he has pulled the wool from his eyes and moved
beyond ideology is not the same as the critic’s calm curiosity. And “criticism," Arnold wrote,
“real criticism, is essentially the exercise of this very quality.”
In the last few decades, literary studies have been subjected to two shocks: radical
theorists’ denials of those studies’ old assumptions and neoliberal universities’ demands
that the discipline justify its use-value (or “impact”). The discipline’s recent soul-searching
and self-examination has resulted in the reformulation of a powerful, and essentially classical,
argument for its value: that, as Helen Small summarises, "Democracy Needs Us.” The real
value of Arnold, Small thinks, is that “he tried to keep instrumentalism, in the main, at a
clear remove from our language”—that he kept “aloof from what is called the ‘practical view 
of things.”’ The anti-instrumentalism of Arnoldian disinterestedness, cultivated through the
study of literature, is indispensable to a healthy democracy—a readiness to question the
assumptions of all factions, and a resistance to being swept away by any one ideology is
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the mark of an intellectually engaged society. For Arnold, it was precisely, and only, such
disinterested curiosity that could serve as an antidote to the un-thinking utilitarianism and
cultural “Philistinism” that had made Victorian democracy so narrow-minded. The great
liberal critic Lionel Trilling perceived this value of “disinterestedness” to political life early
on: "Democracy,” he wrote, "is characterised by its response to ideas” and criticism is "the
instrument for the discovery and evaluation of ideas.” F. W. Bateson, who christened the
journal Essays in Criticism in honour of Arnold, also held that “the ultimate raison d'etre of
criticism in modern mass-society is to be demonstrably right (accurate, just, helpful, relevant,
comprehensive).” This is the classical conception of the critic-as-gadfly. The mission of the
disinterested critic is to form a disinterested citizenry, a community not overly suspicious of,
not automatically hostile to, but always questioning the ideologies of all parties, including,
perhaps especially, those who affect to have transcended ideology.
Arnold’s “disinterestedness,” understood as an approach, or a critical “temper,"
is invaluable to literary criticism today. Arnold did not intend to force a total rejection of
the social world. It is misreading him to understand “disinterestedness” as a systematic
statement of the possibility of the view from nowhere. Arnold enjoins us to think harder, and
think again'. Perhaps we would do well, he suggests, to clutch our principles a little less tightly
in order that we might grasp fresh ones.
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I walk into a museum-what do I see? Perhaps I see a glazed terracotta cup, wide and shallow,
decorated with a scene of three bare-chested men reclined on couches. They talk amongst
themselves while lithe, nude boys move between them to top up vessels just like this one.
The atmosphere hums with sexual possibility. Surprise, relief, and fear collide in a kind of
epiphany: this is not my time, I cannot go there, but I come to understand and identify with
the past of the cup. Or, perhaps that past identifies itself with me.
Many galleries and museums now have queer or LGBTI “trails.” A trail is a
selection of objects already on display, each chosen because it can tell a story about a form 
of beauty, presence, or sociability heretofore lost. These stories were occluded; they fell out of
view. Now, they pierce through the insensate mass of History and are visible. History: it has
failed queer culture; it is bonfires and dustbins-so much has been destroyed or overlooked;
it assigns people, things, and feelings to their proper period, where each is said to belong.
And what it does not categorise, it discards as mere facts about the past, not worth recording.
History cuts time into pieces.
I can think of two responses to this violence. One, cross the line between past
and present. This may take the form of a desire to escape-to get out of the present-or an
attempt to pull standards from the past, by the neck if need be: use the past to describe the
future one wants. Note that crossing a line matters so long as one accepts the line exists: this
first response does not abolish the divisions of historical time. Two, reject the very division
between past and present: stitch time back together. I follow the trail, read the stories, and
re-member a past that has always belonged to me.
For a time, the first response prevailed. A man goes to the British Museum c.1875-
what does he see? Perhaps he sees the past as a distinct place; its alterity gives him pause;
he reflects; yes, it is different, but in a good way. Greek statues, fair and grand forms, have
something to tell nineteenth century London, the money bag of England: exercise and outdoor
activity toughen the body, fortify the mind, and set one down the path of self-possession and
self-restraint. The present is mendicant: it can only be enriched from the outside.
There is a queer version of this response. John Addington Symonds insisted that
Greek statues delivered a homo-erotic message. To admire the self-possession and self­
restraint of the athlete’s body is to desire that body. Symonds celebrates this connection
between virtue and desire in his prose poem “The Song of the Swimmer” (1867). The poet,
walking in Hyde Park, gazes at bodies bathing in the Serpentine and the vaporous dawn: 
A young rough passed before me. Uncouth he looked in his loose
tattered clothes, soiled with labour and the sweat of many days.
He threw his rags aside. Naked he stood there; like an athlete, like a
Greek hero, like Heracles or Hermes in the dawn of noble deeds. His
firm and vital flesh, white, rounded, radiant, shone upon the sward.
If one believes that Hellenic grace, hardiness, and camaraderie can ennoble English society,
then the homo-erotic impulse must be loitering in one’s premises. The key point is this
didactic relation to the past went hand in hand with the past as an escapist fantasy. The poem
is plainly fantastical: it embellishes the distance between classes with the distance between
times. Symonds desired the young rough’s body, made hard by toil; and, like a muse of
bronze antiquity, he sang of this body’s noble shine. Desire across class lines was an indelible
transgression whereas same-sexers felt able to exchange looks with fair and grand forms.
Many Victorians credited Plato with teaching them how to admire male beauty. At
the same time, Plato spoketothem from an unreachable place, beheld by a wistful imagination.
Sat at a window let open to the cool air of the May Term, Lytton Strachey told his diary:
I read for the first time, with a rush of mingled pleasure and pain the Symposium [...]
That day of surprise, relief, and fear to know what I feel now was felt 2000 years ago in
Glorious Greece. Would I have lived then, would I had sat at the feet of Socrates, seen
Alcibiades, the abused, but the great, felt with them all.
The Symposium was a totemic text for the same-sexer with an Oxbridge degree.
Strachey knew he could not go to the past of Socrates and Alcibiades—“would I have lived
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
then”—but, nevertheless, identified totally with what he thought those Creeks had felt as they
reclined into one another’s company. A nod to the Symposium (“fellow drinker”) was how men
might communicate a feeling or way of being together which the trustees of Victorian morals
could barely describe—Parliament settled on the protean phrase, “gross indecency.”
The same held for fiction. Clive Durham, a country gent and the top Classics
student in his year, falls for Maurice Hall, a boy from the suburbs; Hall is coarser and has
fewer moving parts. Back from the Easter vacation, spring now in evidence, Clive pulls
Maurice aside and spells things out:
"I knew you read the Symposium in the vac,” he said in a low voice.
Maurice felt uneasy.
"Then you understand—without me saying more—"
“How do you mean?”
Durham could not wait. People were all around them, but with eyes that had gone
intensely blue he whispered, “I love you.”
Maurice is horrified at first but soon settles into the idea. He recognises the
pleasure which Clive takes in his company and knows it is reciprocal. They cut lectures, kiss
a little, sleep next to each other but not together. Their falling in love occupies the first half of
Maurice, written by E.M. Forster between 1913 and 1914.
Plato may have spoken to young Clive but Greece turns out to be mute and
inhospitable:
Clive sat in the theatre of Dionysus. The stage was empty, as it had been for many
centuries, the auditorium empty [...] Here dwelt his gods (...) But he saw only dying light
and a dead land. He uttered no prayer, believed in no deity and knew that the past was
devoid of meaning like the present, and a refuge for cowards.
Clive turns to women. Greece recedes. But Maurice insists the possibility of love
between men does not go with it. The pivotal chapter of the second half describes a meeting
between Maurice and Alec, the Durhams’s gamekeeper, in the British Museum. Forster knew
same-sexers visited these galleries to cruise, and be cruised by, the past. He had his own
encounter with a wonderful boy who “throb(bed) like something under the sea,” stone turned
to flesh. But now the building suggests a tomb. Old statutes totter. Maurice’s prep school
teacher appears and pays tribute to the age of heroes. The lovers are unmoved. They stand
out against the perfect and bloodless marble: “Maurice swerved and their muscles clipped.
By now they were in love with one another consciously.” They leave, find a room, and spend
their second night together.
Forster did not want this story published during his lifetime. Maurice waited until
1971, the year after its author’s death. In the meantime, the manuscript was passed around
a handful of Forster’s queer peers and mentioned to a few more. Lytton Strachey read it in
1915. He thought Forster took the sex act too seriously. The second half of the book turns
on it—Maurice’s fear of it, need of it, and pursuit of it. Strachey liked the combination of
Cambridge boys until one came down with a case of lust and sentiment. Maurice fussed over
his prick; he had a lot to learn—and not from Alec. What most alarmed Strachey was Forster
seemed to think that sex with another man was justified by one falling in love with the other.
He told his friend, “I really think the whole conception of male copulation in the book rather
diseased.” Ultimately, Maurice is happy with Alec, happier than he was stroking Clive’s hair,
and it looks like they will last (Strachey, however, gave them six months). Some fifty years
later, Forster stood behind his ever after, “A happy ending was imperative. I shouldn’t have
bothered to write otherwise.” That was the author’s purpose but his point, the force of what
he wrote, was that same-sexers should not model themselves on what they thought Socrates
felt for Alcibiades.
Maurice and Alec could not escape to the Hellenic past, nor did this past say
much about how to make a future that would accept them. And, for reasons of class as much
as sexual difference, they could not stay in their present, early twentieth century London. So,
Forster sent them to the greenwood. They disappear into the shade of an ancient bower:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maurice pays Clive a final visit, repudiates him and then vanishes when the other is distracted,
“leaving no trace of his presence except a little pile of the petals of the evening primrose,
which mourned from the ground like an expiring fire.” Clive never figures out where Maurice
went or what became of him. And with Greece out of the picture, there is no past where their
relationship can rest. His friend beckons'to him from “some eternal Cambridge,” but no
window-side epiphany is possible here. The scents and sounds of the May Term settle on a
closed book and an empty chair.
We, however, have notice as to Maurice’s direction of escape. He first encounters
Alec on the grounds at Penge, the Durhams’s mouldering estate. That evening, looking out
his window, he imagines a life lived in the open air, in “big spaces where passion clasped
peace, spaces no science could reach, but they existed for ever, full of woods, some of them,
and arched with majestic sky and a friend." This is Forster’s pastoral fantasy. The greenwood
is a zone which Society has not penetrated. Maurice and Alec escape to an other England; it
is “an exile they gladly embrace.”
As to their future, Forster was ambivalent. Maurice and Alec may have got out,
enjoyed a bit of peace, but he doubted they could evade the bureaucratic eye of post-war
government, whose agents “stamped upon, built over, and patrolled" more and more of
England. The greenwood was always a nostalgic conception. Fredric Jameson describes
the nostalgia of moderns like Forster as the passionate longing for exile in time. It is the
anticipation and fallout of a rupture between the present and the past. Talk of big spaces no
science could reach had purchase for as long as people thought those spaces were coming
to an end. Forster resented the total visibility which had come to characterise modern life,
the sense that one is the object of constant examination and measurement from an unseen
vantage. The attraction of the greenwood did not depend on whether Maurice and Alec could
really go there. It was a fantasy which made up for a future that had not yet arrived: Forster
dedicated Maurice “to a happier year.” Again, the present lacks; he fashioned an escape.
Forster saw in the English countryside a past where he could imagine getting lost;
the peripatetic narrator of W.G. Sebald’s The Rings of Saturn (1995) sees an expansive and
devastated present. He walks the county of Suffolk until rendered immobile by unnumbered
confrontations with the "traces of destruction," reaching far back into time. The narrator, a
man who might be Sebald, has survived centuries; he can escape nothing. He wakes up in
a Norfolk hospital and begins to write down what he can remember of his trail through the
country.
Cinders and dust are the book’s keynotes. The bonfires of History appear early
and their heat is felt throughout. Likewise, the narrator is drawn again and again to crumbling
things. Somerleyton Hall, once an oriental palace more dazzling than anything Coleridge
could imagine in an opium dream, is now a wedding venue. The aviary is empty but for a
single demented quail; pacing its cage; and faded velvets line rooms filled with misplaced
paraphernalia and furniture which has forgotten its intended uses. The narrator laments: “it
takes just one awful second, I often think, and an entire epoch passes.” History destroys or
discards, and against this the past does not stand a chance.
Not safe with History, the past is driven into the arms of memory. Each of Sebald’s
narrators embarks upon a journey in the character of a quest. The object of that quest is not
always clear, but it usually involves investigations which lead him to grieve, hallucinate, evoke,
and re-member a world irretrievably lost. He seeks out remnants of that world and, by the
careful accumulation and exposition of each remnant’s details, lends a new fullness to the
past. He makes his own trail through time. For example, the narrator of The Emigrants (1992)
starts with the faint recollection of his great-uncle Ambrose at a family gathering some forty
years ago and then traces Ambrose’s passage from Germany through the grand hotels of
Europe, into the employment of the Solomons of Long Island, and, ultimately, to a sanatorium
in Ithaca, New York. The narrator visits several of these places. At Ithaca, he locates Dr
Abramsky, assistant to the psychiatrist who ran the sanatorium. Medical records have since
rotted away. But Abramsky remembers Ambrose committed himself of his own free will and
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
submitted to daily electric shock treatment. He recounts the last day of Ambrose’s life:
I see him lying before me [...] the electrodes on his temples, the rubber bit between his
teeth, buckled into the canvas wraps that were riveted to the treatment table like a man
shrouded for burial at sea. The session proceeded without incident.
This is so close. But about another aspect of Ambrose's life there is complete
reticence: Ambrose’s nephew says his uncle, “was of the other persuasion.” The narrator
never mentions this again, let alone investigates his great-uncle’s sexuality. We are told that
Ambrose spent much of his life traveling with and waiting on the younger Solomon, Cosmo.
They spent unnumbered summers together, including many in Normandy and at least one
aboard a steam yacht, cruising from Venice to Greece and onto Constantinople. The narrator
reads Ambrose’s diary from the latter holiday but passes no comment on the reference to
“our bed,” and to Cosmo stirring at the diarist’s side early one morning. Ambrose’s sexuality
and how it related to the rest of his life are not explained. The narrator cannot evoke the
ordeals of this man who may have loved his employer’s son—for as long as they knew each
other, for the course of their trip across the Mediterranean, or for a few hours that morning
in Constantinople, before Cosmo woke up. Ambrose’s inner life is, in large part, beyond the
reach of memory.
The Ambrose of The Emigrants is not the Ambrose who was known to his 
contemporaries, even to himself. Not his family, not his employers, not his doctors had so 
broad an understanding of where he came from and how he came to his end. James Wood,
writing in the New Republic, observes that Sebald’s collection of these facts does not preserve
the past as it really was but transforms the cinders and dust into something "newly real”
which can exist only in Sebald’s fictions—that is to say, in memory. The past of The Emigrants
or The Rings of Saturn cannot exist independently of the narrator, who gathers up its remnants
and then imbues them with a fullness which Wood calls "parasitical of, yet rivalrous to, the
real world.” This appears to explain the epigraph which introduces The Emigrants, “And
the last remnants / memory destroys.” Again, to remember is not to preserve the past but
to transform its traces into something new, which exists in and belongs to the narrator’s
memory.
Memory is the defeat of historical time-time as men like Symonds and Forster
knew it (a pregnant past, a present which lacks, and an unresolved future). The narrator of The
Rings of Saturn, walking toward an abandoned Cold War-era research facility set on a coastal
promontory, describes the collapse of those categories into an expansive present:
The closer I came to these ruins, the more any notion of a mysterious isle of the dead
receded, and the more I imagined myself amidst the remains of our own civilisation after
its extinction in some future catastrophe.
At first, the facility belongs to a distinct and inaccessible past. Indeed, for many
years people were forbidden from approaching the site. But now, the narrator can go there
and, as he makes his way across the island, the living merge with the dead. He sees his own
civilisation alive and then remembers that time has already run out on it. Every memory is this
catastrophe. Time is not a chain of discrete events but appears as one continuing disaster
which heaps its remains around his feet. The narrator inhabits a future whose possibilities
are now exhausted and so fills his days ruminating on a past that will not go down. He feels
haunted by “ghosts of repetition.” Nothing new can happen: every gesture he might make
or opinion he might utter feels somehow familiar, as if it has already been expressed, then
catalogued and put on display in an imaginary museum. Those visitations can reduce him to
a state of immobility, “as though, without being aware of it, one had suffered a stroke.” But
these are never fatal. The narrator ultimately sees himself as one of the “survivors.”
In this way, Sebald takes a long second look at the violence of European modernity.
Compare Forster: he tried to save Maurice from a hostile present by sending him to the
imagined past of the greenwood. Sebald denies his narrators that escape. He challenges them
to stitch time back together and comprehend the emotional and material change of the last
few centuries as if each had lived through it. As a result, they mourn for the violence done
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to the newly real, for Ambrose or Somerleyton Hall; they mourn for the violence of historical
time in general, its tendency to break up and discard; and, they mourn for what they cannot
remember and must leave out of their account.
On his journey the narrator encounters fragments of time which he cannot evoke
or explain, including from his own life: “At earlier times, in the summer evenings during my
childhood when I had watched from the valley as swallows circled in the last light, still in great
numbers in those days, I would imagine that the world was held together by the courses they
flew through the air.” We do not know when those earlier times were or where that valley
was; we cannot say why the swallows disappeared; but the narrator addresses us like we can
help him make sense of these things. This reticence is, in Wood’s phrase, “the very stutter
of mourning." The text is full of such inexpressible gaps. Ambrose’s sexuality, which I have
already discussed, is another example. It is raised on a handful of occasions and obliquely
each time, in contrast to, say, the circumstances of his death: the narrator asks Dr Abramsky
to describe the process of shock treatment and records the answers in unflinching detail. But
when the psychiatrist mentions the diagnosis (senile depression) may have been incorrect, the
narrator lets this revelation hang. The suggestion Ambrose’s despondency had something to
do with his experience of the closet can only be conjectural. His inner life, like the world from
which the swallows disappeared, cannot be evoked in memory and must remain unfamiliar.
Sebald’s fictions are devoid of nostalgia in the sense that the narrators do not
long for exile in time. They see (almost) everything at once and from above. The vantage of
memory is akin to that of a person who stands at the centre of a camera obscura: the narrator
sees a panorama projected onto the walls around him; time is visible from every direction.
He regards these images with degrees of unease though often looks closer: “In response to
my request, Dr Abramsky described shock treatment in greater detail.” More unsettling is the
abundance of time itself, which, as mentioned, can lead to a kind of immobility that feels like
one is suffering a stroke. But none of this causes the narrator to give up his vantage. He does
not contemplate a return to the linear perspective of History.
Likewise, nobody sincerely wants to live in the time when sex between men was
illegal, let alone the time of Plato, when pederasty was the go. Mary Beard blinks at the
proposal that a nice man from the BBC conduct sex education classes in the British Museum:
we cannot look at Creek sexuality “head on,” she says; we need a less didactic approach. No 
one looks longingly back on the greenwood, either. Whereas Forster thought it was best for
Maurice that he disappears, his life shaded from scrutiny and measurement, so many queer
people now rejoice in being seen.
Total visibility is not just a pattern in contemporary culture but a principle which
guides action. The primary concern of something like a museum trail is to make the queerness
of other times visible to us: it identifies the traces of that queerness and invites the visitor to
remember lives that were lived in ways never known to History. But the risk is that these
memories of the newly real will flow a little too easily-ike a succession of floats at the pride
parade. This is not to say every remembering must be a Sebaldian lament. We should rejoice
in each story of a person who managed to tell someone else who they were. And I take it as
read that there is plenty for which queer people can grieve. But we should allow ourselves to
stutter, too. If the inner life of a person like Ambrose proves difficult to evoke, then perhaps
we should not strain for it.
Our vantage, that of memory rather than History, may lead to a sense that other
times can always be made visible and culturally familiar. We prefer the company of similar
ghosts. Any gesture, any style, any sensibility-it can be reclaimed for now. Exploration of
complexity or a spectrum of identities might restrain that impulse, but these can become
mana words—plugs that adjust themselves to the size of the hole. My point is people are
also defined by lacunae. Certain forms of beauty, presence, and sociability are now beyond
apprehension. I do not mean the search for remnants is futile. The search is worth undertaking
whether it yields another story for one’s trail or not: negative space is no less meaningful for
the colour that surrounds it. Rather than trying to close these gaps, I suggest reticence is how 
we can mourn for queer ways to be which are now impossible to imagine.
Arresting Forgetting
Samuel White
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why should we care about those who have walked these grounds before us? Are they not
simply names on a wall or board we walk past daily on our urgent, voluntary errands? Even
the remarkable ones, do they not simply add to the list of people whom we admire but will
never meet or,' perhaps more depressingly, whose existence we benefit from but whose
presence we need never acknowledge. How can we transubstantiate this starchy portrait in
the Calmahra 1938 issue into a man whom we can appraise and respond to:
Chester James Parker (born July 1916, Charters Towers) entered into the University’s
social life with his characteristic enthusiasm. He showed keen interest in all the Clubs
and Societies and was an active member always in the Dramatic Society [...] He followed
up this good work by having an eminently successful year as President of the Union.
Throughout he gave the impression of dependability and strength. He was practical
and firm in all matters [...] His pleasing bearing and personality were appreciated by
all with whom he came in contact. He was a definite force of no mean influence in the
University. There is no doubt that his qualities are such as inevitably grow to leadership
and distinction.’
Parker was an upstanding young man in a time when that adjective did not sound
dated or ironic. Four years later he would be declared lost at sea somewhere south-west of
Crete following a minor, forgotten naval skirmish. In April 1943, the Rhodes House Warden—
Chester won a Rhodes Scholarship—wrote to Chester’s family:
During the comparatively short time that he was at Oxford, he commended himself to
everybody with whom he came into contact and was obviously a young man in whom
one was justified in reposing high hopes. It was characteristic of him to respond so
promptly and so simply to what he felt to be a call to duty, and the characteristics which
he had shown here and in his earlier years clearly stood him in good stead as a Naval
officer.2
Two colourless, well-meaning accounts bookend his life. Chester, like so many
other young men, would be transformed into a name on a board, in a book, and of a building:
Parker Hall is a boarding house at Toowoomba Grammar.3 Like Goddard, Parnell, and Steele,
Parker has become a name we walk past and under. But there is no fife or meaning in those
names or between these bookends. Perhaps wresting a man from records, memorials, and
historical documents can begin by telling his fife.
In 1938, after attaining Honours from the School of English Language and
Literature, Chester accepted the Queensland Rhodes Scholarship to study law at Oxford. Law
did not hold his attention for long. The fascist threat dogging Continental Europe loomed
over his mind and his letters to his sweetheart (Miss Winifred Hanger):
I’m worried. So unsettled in fact by the ugly nightmare that’s in the process of being
enacted into reality, that thoughts of love and law are jostled rudely into the background,
just as they are being ruthlessly thrust aside by these maniacal dictators and their hellish
followers.4
It is a harsh thing to tell your sweetheart that love has been jostled to the
background. The outbreak of the Second World War more than jostled Chester’s fife. He
notified Rhodes House that he was enquiring about the appropriate venue for enlisting for
active service in either Australia or England.5 He was recommended for a commission in the
Royal Navy, and was told that he would not be called up before Christmas 1939.® But wars
accord to no plan. Chester volunteered for active service in November 1939, abandoning his 
studies and scholarship.7 In a letter to his brother (Athol) he wrote:
Though it may sound a bit idealist and old fashioned, I’m rather passionately convinced
of the necessity for fighting Hitlerism. It’s like a ghastly disease that if unchecked would
soon spread and corrupt the world. It is directly opposed to all of the best progress
that Europe has made over many hundreds of years—freedom of thought and action,
kindliness etc. And so I threw in my lot with those that are trying to get rid of it. I thought
the Navy was going to be the main weapon for beating it.8
It does sound idealist and old fashioned. It sounds like what one would expect
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to find in a small, local-history museum. And yet there is a young man of twenty-three
behind those lines. A young man who possessed earnestness, forthrightness of belief, and a
readiness to act upon those beliefs—qualities we should not dismiss as quaint.
In 1940, Chester was commissioned in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR)
as Sub-Lieutenant in an Armed Merchant Cruiser Dunvegan Castle? On 27 August 1940, the
German U-46 Endrass encountered Chester’s vessel ofFthe north-west coast of Ireland. That
night, U-46 Endrass sank the Dunvegan Castle with casualties. Chester was rescued with other
servicemen by HM ships Primrose and Harvester.'0 He was landed at Gourock, Scotland and
granted six weeks’ leave after the ordeal." In September 1940, during the Battle of Britain,
Chester wrote to the Rhodes Warden:
I’m well and enjoying a princely fourteen days’ leave [in Kent] after the torpedoing of
my ship in the North Atlantic last week. I lost all my kit but had to endure nothing
more terrible than a couple of hours’ immersion in extremely oily water [...] down here
[in Kent] the interruptions aren’t nearly as irritating—indeed they’re quite entertaining.
Scarcely a day goes by that we don’t have a good view of a dogfight or two.'2
In November 1940, Chester arrived in Alexandria as part of Operation COLLAR/
Convoy MB46, the objective of which was to transport 1,400 soldiers through the
Mediterranean, escort two Merchant Vessels into Malta and a third to Crete, to attack an
airfield at Alghero, and to reinforce the presence of the Navy.'3 Chester, a speck on a general’s
board, writes of his contentment with a life alternating between frenetic engagements
and lulling inaction: “I like the atmosphere of a small ship and my shipmates are all good
fellows.”'4 There is something relatable in that smallness.
It may be odd, but the most intimate account of Chester’s life does not come
from biography or letters, but fiction. Temporary Lieutenant H. G. Williams RNVR, a fellow
shipmate, penned One Eye on the Clock. And in that novel, Chester, despite being anonymised
into a digger, becomes knowable:
He had probably more to lose by the Warthan any of us, because he had all the ingredients
of character for success—brains, industry, and determination. His early youth had been
spent in a hard school in Australia and in a manner beyond the comprehension of an
ordinary English parent. He had played in the village band as a boy and chased home
his father’s cows; in his spare time he has worked in the contracting business, and as a
mere youth has driven lorries for hundreds of miles over difficult roads.
Then had come a Rhodes Scholarship and he had sat back, rather astounded, thinking:
“Me, a kid from Townsville! Christ Church!” But nonetheless, he was going to show
them over there in England.
He was a self-contained person. He was not voluble over his sorrows, like Martyn and
me. His way of expressing them was simply to become more silent. He was always
trying to improve himself: in a very short while he became an expert in navigation and at
sea we were never without a fix we could depend on.
Then he would have a desire to speak fluent French or to master the elements of Italian. 
His hard work was never interrupted by how he was feeling, for, despite his great
strength, he was never really well. His strength of mind used to astound me.
Personally, I shall never forget him on his first night, in a pitching Corvette, seating
chicken and trying to look unconcerned, though his face was green as a billiard table.
When I left the ship, he was talking of volunteering for submarines. When I later looked
him up in the Navy list, he had, indeed, been posted to one.’’5
On 14 May 1942, Chester was posted as 1st Lieutenant (Second in Command)
of HM Submarine Thom in Alexandria. HMS Thorn was a large T-Class submarine with a
crew of fifty.'6 On 7 August 1942, HMS Thom encountered the Italian torpedo boat Pegaso
conducting an escort operation (with Axis aircraft support) 30 miles south west of the island
ofGavdos near Crete. Lieutenant de Petris onboard the Pegaso observed Axis aircraft machine­
gunning the water. He saw a periscope surface before detecting the presence of a submarine
on the ECG. Between 12:58 and 13:47, the Pegaso conducted seven depth charges, after which
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bubbles were allegedly seen and the ECG presence was lost. Further observations revealed
more air bubbles and oil on the surface. No survivors were seen. HMS Thom was declared
as “seriously overdue and declared lost” on 11 August 1942 when she failed to return from
patrol.'7 Chester’s naval records state that he was lost in HMS Thom on 7 August 1942.'8
A memorial cannot return a man to life. Nor can it dictate how one is to live.
Perhaps it can only arrest a slow forgetting.
A soul shall draw from out the vast
And strike his being into bounds, 
And moved thro' life of lower phase, 
Result in man, be bom and think,
And act and love, a closer link
Betwixt us and the crowning race
-Lord Alfred Tennyson, “In Memoriam A.H.H.”
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H erst on: "Darkness where he can be free."
Damian Maher
It is a sad moment in a gay man’s life when he realises that to learn the history of his forebears,
he must turn to criminal records. Love, intellect, bravery, and selflessness find no room there.
Only shady, humiliating vignettes can fester in those prosecutions. The harsh reprisals cannot
be undone by absolutions or the pity of a reader—Dante’s benevolence alleviates not by a
degree the eternal damnation of those seventh-circle sodomites. But when men sublimate
their love to avoid being found in the tomes of criminal law, what alternative do we have then
but to plunge into that darkness? E. M. Forster’s Maurice provides one:
Ah for darkness—not the darkness of a house which coops up a man among furniture,
but the darkness where he can be free...if only he could get to it—love—nobility—big
spaces where passion clasped peace, spaces no science could reach, but they existed for
ever, full of woods some of them, and arched with majestic sky and a friend...
The Brisbane suburb of Herston from December 1860 to August 1866 may have
been such a big space of freeing darkness. I say “may” for we can only grope at sublimated
truths, at intimacies kept private in even the most well-lit dwellings.
Robert Herbert—a priggish, well-dressed, softly-spoken, short, and short-sighted
man with a high forehead—first lived with John Bramston in 1855. The two first met at Balliol
College. They shared an apartment in London while also sharing the rank of Fellow at All
Souls’ Oxford, fathers too far down the lineage to take advantage of primogeniture, BCLs, and
a nascent yearning for colonial excursion. In 1859, Herbert would move to the newly formed
state of Queensland to serve as its colonial secretary. With Bramston swiftly following, and
Herbert’s election as Queensland’s first premier, the two twinned their surnames to create
the fifty-acre estate of Herston.
In a letter to his mother, Herbert writes: “You would think Herston an odd place
just now, if you drove up. There are many improvements going on. Railings round the stable
and kitchen, a new flower garden to be made, clearing timber besides all the usual kitchen
gardening, so we have kept on Webb." We have kept on Webb. We are responsible for this odd
place where peacocks roam, vegetable patches abound, and a baby pig washes up: “It is very
tame. We had to buy a baby’s bottle to feed it with.” That "we” is not incidental to the task of
dashing offletters to far-off family, it reappears again and again among Herbert's telegraphic
prose—a sublimated signifierofan unnameable signified. “We have been catching quantities
of magnificent prawns in the creek which surrounds Herston”; “The peacocks cause us some
anxiety by roaming”; "Today we have a luncheon party. I have all my letters to write, and the
Honbl. J.B. is decking out the rooms, making the nosegays, etc.” It is all too easy to piece
together a collage of cosy, genteel domesticity.
Aided by those old protectors of wealth and status, the two men could ensconce
themselves in a seemingly platonic cocoon. Although the threat of capital punishment for
buggery lingered until 1861, the public—yet to be roused by the Wilde trials of the 1890s—
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
had little course to rend open that cocoon of we, that I and a friend under the majestic sky.
But when that friend departs, the darkness is lonely: “John Bramston is away for the Assizes,
and I am alone...
But domesticity is not love. And a historian would snarl at the allusion I made to
a sexual relationship when there is no direct evidence of one. How could there be? Robert
Herbert did not face trial. He was not publically humiliated. He was not forced to resign in
disgrace and flee back to a quiet, provincial municipal job. Direct evidence could take no
other form. Although we cannot place our weight upon it, we may at least grasp at allusion:
The heat is now becoming "severely intense." “Mosquitoes already ferocious, but thanks to
my new net room, under the verandah, in which we sit every evening, they do not get much
out of us at Herston." I can’t help but think of David Malouf on the Queenslander: there
can be few of us “who do not associate under-the-house, guiltily or as a great break-out of
themselves, with their first touch or taste of sex.” But if the two men simply sat, read, and
talked on still Queensland summer nights, is that not love? Is that not an amulet we may hold
close when forced to step into a darkness less tender and more brutal?
The relationship does ebb. Bramston will marry, which Herbert acknowledges as
the only right course: “The Honble. John preserves his figure beautifully and ought to be able
to mar7 when he is at home.” Herbert will never marry. The two will not live together after
departing Queensland in 1866. Herston will pass into the hands of James Francis Garrick and
slowly condense into its present, sterile form.
But for that brief period of time, there was love at Herston. I cannot define what
their love was, but I have faith in its existence. Regardless of its form, its definition, or its
longevity, is that not enough? Is it not enough that there has existed a place in this state, if
not forever then preserved forever, where passion clasped peace under a majestic sky? It is
enough for me.
Your Obsession Might Be a Fish
Hamish Lonergan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The worst part of Frank Gehry's fish phase was that he didn’t know it was silly until it was over.
He knows now—he has called them kitsch failures. But it took him a jumping fish building in
Kobe and the Peix Olfmpic in Barcelona to come to his senses. Now they only turn up in his
sculptures where he seems to think there's more latitude for the kitsch than in architecture.
All this raises a terrible question: what if your creative obsession is a fish? Not that it’s an
animal, or even that it’s kitsch, but maybe your muse is important only to you, will not age
gracefully, and even you will regret it later.
Gehry's is a cautionary tale. It gives us three questions to help identify a fish
before it takes over.
1. Do you struggle to articulate why you like it? Gehry has flip-flopped so much on
the fish’s origins that it may be he is entirely sure himself. Was it inspired by the gefilte
fish swimming in his grandmother's tub, ready for Sabbath? Or was it the pieces of
shattered Formica, which reminded him of scales for his fish lamp? Or was it really his 
reaction to postmodernism? This leads us to the second question.
2. Is your obsession a reaction to a dominant style? Does it want to be "new”? Gehry 
chose the fish when postmodernists chose columns. He said, facetiously, if you have to
look back for inspiration, look way back to our evolutionary ancestor, the fish. And he
liked the form so much it stuck.
3. Is it a total style? Is every creative question answered by the obsession? Do you
fail to expose yourself to other sources of inspiration? Gehry called the fish “a complete
vocabulary that I can draw from.” The fish provided double curves, a sense of movement,
a surface of different parts (scales), and a ready-made structural solution for hanging it
all together (skeleton).
If the answer to two or more questions is yes, then it’s probably a fish.
Alternatively, don't identify it at all. Keep going with your obsession. Revel in the
iterative process. Develop it across years and projects. Refuse to admit its failure, even to
yourself. Because maybe it’s not a fish, or maybe it is, but Gehry claims the curves ofthe fish
turned into the curves of Bilbao.
I can imagine a fish pedagogy where students choose a fish—their own totem—
and develop it across projects. At some stage, it morphs into Disney Hall. But the stakes
would be high; the risk is that it stays a fish.
How Can You Not Have Read...?
Robin Pringle
It is a wretched thing that this question opener—so readily concluded with every work of
literature no matter how niche—has metastasised. No longer can it be surely diagnosed by
the following symptoms: .
1. A simultaneous tucking ofthe chin and elevation ofthe eyebrows.
2. A dactyl that stomps on the "not” before swaggering forward in loping iambs.
3- An instantaneous amnesia that there will have been a time, possibly even as early
as yesterday, when the questioner will not have read the novel that is just absolutely
compulsory reading, which they cannot possibly fathom even a remotely meaningful
existence without.
4. A similar, but distinguishable, amnesia of every other novel, essay, poem, or
drama the questioner has not read.
5. A strange immunity to the self-disgust that should be pulsating through their
person. Anecdotal experience suggests this immunity only grows stronger with repeated
questioning.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the question really is: “How have you not been able to have read X," we were able
to diagnose it as an odious pustule. A quick jab with a sterilised needle ordinarily does the
trick: I have been living, I have been reading Y, I have no interest in X, no-one except you
and two scholars have read X. Or one can let it deflate on its own, leaving behind nothing
but a curdled pus. But when the question metastasises into a pervasive assumption, such
remedies are ineffectual.
A scene in an academic's office.
Academic: (Generously) Well, I suppose that’s a novel point on Baldwin, but when
you consider Giovanni's Room in relation to Mann’s Death in Venice, surely, we must
reconsider their love as not merely erotic, but spiritual?
Undergraduate: (Any ideas have vacated their brain, fraud is the only viable course)
Possibly...
A moment's pause where the undergraduate realises their only hope is to float off the now
unfamiliar ground with a hot-air balloon of generalisations.
From the comfy sofa of familiar books, we are ejected into the hard-backed chair of
unfamiliarity. The problem here, and indeed in many social chats about literature, is that the
assumption may be so inviolable that the conversation barely even eddies about questions of
having read the text, and instead descends into the rapids of discussing it.
But what are we to do? We can’t go around constantly testing the ice for cracks,
constantly asking: “Have you happened to have read, now it is ok if you haven't I want to be
very clear on that, I am not one of those people, but if we do happen (and I say happen as
it is only a measure of probability not of our respective intellects) Hamlet?” The first thing
is to putdown the odious question that entitles this essay. The second thing is to admit to
ourselves and one another that we are all part of a massive literary cartel. A cartel that does
not seek to inflate prices, but instead via tacit agreement maintain higher levels of literary
discussion by augmenting our "have-read" list. Ok, fine, we lie about the books we have read,
and yes, our motivations are largely base, narcissistic ones. Like a man when asked about his
penis size, we inflate the measure.
But I propose this inflation serves a public good. If one simply says: “No, I haven’t
read it," the conversation is guillotined. Or the other must explain the plot—checking before
they ruin it that you won’t read it, which you absolutely must—as well as make their original
point. It is far easier to explain a joke and keep the laugh. We are not to be despised but quietly
praised for maintaining the conversation with the non-committal “Oh yes,” "Oh right," and
“I couldn't agree more."
But to at least attempt to clarify which interactions are genuine, which are false,
and which may be maintained by the cartel, I have compiled a list of the most common extra
inches a person adds to their literary member:
• ’9&f;
• That other Bronte sister, what’s her name?
• Lolita;
• 68.72153% of Charles Dickens;
• Catch-22;
• Frankenstein;
• War and Peace;
• Joyce's Ulysses (except maybe for that Molly guff at the end); and
• The cetological chapters in Moby Dick.
But if you sense me growing smug, know that I’ve never read (among many other
things) The Lord of the Rings. I tell you this not to humble myself, but so you know not to tread
on this crumbling ice for into the water you’ll go.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the archives
The Academic Mind
Galmahra Vol. 1, No. 1 May 1921, pp. 25-28
Jack Lindsay1
It is perhaps hardly fair to attack anything for not being other than it must be. It is useless, for
example, to fall foul of a dog because it cannot appreciate the lyric warmth of Shakespeare’s
Venus and Adonis, or a cow because it fails to respond to the joy of the finale of Beethoven’s
Ninth Symphony. The academic, however, though his mind is not intrinsically any more
important than that of the other animals just mentioned, provokes attack because he claims
to set up a standard, and to settle for ever questions of Art and Life over which he is equally
incompetent to have any jurisdiction. Attack has no effect whatever upon him: however, it
enables us to rid ourselves of a little of our exasperation and, if continued long enough, it
may succeed in making him slightly uneasy. It could never touch his blind eyes with vision, or
wake the lyric flame in his blood, and without that he can never do anything else but move,
repeating learnt formulas, amid uncomprehended and luring Beauty: A eunuch who feels
the touch of lustful limbs and watches the provocative poise of body in the gay pageant of
naked life that sweeps past him where challenging eye catches eye and hands touch and cling
and joy leaps in the heart of careless lovers, quite coldly with no more emotion than if he were
examining a beetle under a microscope. Let us then never lose a chance of kicking this dead
organism because it is dead, as often and as hard as possible.
A University is chiefly of use in that the student may discover himself and his
personal vision by recoil from the opacity of the academic. It has nothing to give him else
except a few tools of trade—I speak here, of course, of those for whom education is a
matter of the development of mind and not the acquiring of a few facts to enable them to
mismanage some practical affairs; but it is an invaluable experience of an antithesis to all that
is really valuable in Life and Thought. The person of weak intellect is drawn into the academic
maw and solidifies into the usual formulas that masquerade for thought at a University, but
anyone who has individuality finds it intensified in his reaction against that inert mass of text
books and accumulated rubbish. One of our strongest impulses towards Beauty is derived
from Ugliness: we need the crude emphasis of What is not, to help us towards What is. The
battle of life is all the more worth fighting because we have so many evil and Christian forces
striving towards Death. In the same way the adamantine impenetrability of the academic
mind is the best sign-post towards all that it stands in opposition to. Once we no longer need
the stimulus of its dead and sexless condition, it is best to fling it aside; but there is nothing
better for Youth that has mind to develop than to arrive at the academic repudiation of all the
serious issues of Life, and to find its way to Life over the trampled bodies of the academics.
The annoying part is that being dead they never recognise when we have trampled on them:
which deprives us of some of our feeling of triumph.
Among the first things the academic tries to do is to undermine and depreciate all enthusiasm,
all that he calls extremism or mania, any passionate conviction ofTruth. He claims the need
for that incomprehensible condition—the ability to look at a thing from both sides—that
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is to say, not to look at it at all. Life is not a mathematical problem, nor morality a matter
of Spinozistic geometry. It is amusing to see the academic publicly making what are really
indecent declarations and exhibitions of his castrated condition, as if it were something to be
proud of. The way to arrive at Truth is not to make a cold analytical survey of a question any
more than the way to live is to sit in a study and try to make introspective studies into your
consciousness: the fact is that no single question can have any Truth in it: Truth is condition
of mind, not an answer to a finite problem. Youth must always be right, for it has the vitality of
blood: old age is the only real crime and the academic was born with a greybeard. "Exuberance
is beauty” says Blake in one of his great gnomic sentences, and we might add, “Exuberance
is wisdom.” But how can we bring to mind that which has not even arrived at actuality, a
sense of Spirit, or the fluidity of Form. The academic is a mind that exists in external forms,
in rigidity of line; how can he ever guess the despair and exaltation of the mind driving by an
inner knowledge of Beauty, that passionate Desire of Generation in the Beautiful both with
regard to Body and Soul that Plato stated as the force by which consciousness is created and
developed? He merely stares blankly and asks for definitions: and he is quite sincere; he is
really puzzled; he has no community of symbol: at the most he lends you a condescending
tolerance, and says that age brings experience. He is quite right in his repudiation of all that
develops by a personal knowledge of Beauty, for his whole conception of Form has been
learnt, and no man can conceive conditions that do not exist in himself. When he says that all
knowledge of Beauty or Form come to him by experience, he is probably speaking the exact
truth, just as Constable no doubt was when he said, “It was these trees that taught me how
to paint.” How can the objective mind conceive the Turner or Gruner who uses the material
of earth merely to express his inner vision of rhythm [sic] and Light. Since he has arrived by
education, how can he understand that genuine mind arrives by freeing itself from education,
as Wagner pointed out, by freeing itself from the external impact of sensation, not merely by
responding to it. But all this is quite unreal to the academic or aesthetic mind, lost in Nature 
or Decoration, both of which are barren, and it is for this reason that no attack can ever
reach its complacence in the slightest. It is secure in its knowledge. “I arrived by education:
therefore all mind must have arrived by education.” It is unable to see that there would not
even be any intellectual tradition if this were the truth: it is wedded to that fantastic doctrine
that mind is the result of gradual growth, of induction from observation, when it is obvious
that the senses are blind processes, and that wherever we have mind we have equality of
mind. There is not a fraction of Time between Praxiteles and Rodin. Education, as Plato
pointed out, is a process of forgetting, and all genuine development is in the nature of an
effort of Memory.
Our whole understanding and analysis of this curious by-product, the academic,
must hinge on the fact that it is a made mind, not a genuine mind at all. It believes that it is
thinking, but is only repeating. For the most part it works in a circle: it can only understand
its own remarks and deductions: anything else is incomprehensible, consequently it can
only learn from itself—that is, never learn anything. For some two thousand five hundred
years, ever since that arch-academic Aristotle, it has been repeating things about Plato, and
instead of getting any nearer it has gradually got further and further away, until now Plato at
a University is indistinguishable from a mild Methodist or a devout social reformer, with a
smattering of vague logic. Plato's real work is the greatest philosophic statement ever made
of the origin of Life and Art and the basic impulses of Passion that direct them. After this we
cease to wonder at anything, even at the astounding criticism that finds Shakespeare a “good
ttlan," and shuts its eyes and senses to the lustful nature of his women, or that discovers
Christian resignation and consolation in the exultant defiance and laughter of Beethoven, and
Pity in Wagner, or that considers Byron’s Don Juan a clever social satire. We can only come
to the conclusion that, like Voltaire's bon pere defamille, the academic is capable of anything,
knowing that it itself is a made mind the academic naturally gives a weird account of what
he calls the growth of Literature and Art. Being able only to see external forms and therefore
unable to recognise that all mind is of the same element, and all the expression of the same
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
hidden symbol of perfection, he divides Mind into nationalities and periods. This is the most
peculiar muddle he is in owing to his inability to distinguish the creative intellect from the
perceptive: it has its basis in the belief that events make minds, that mind is merely the result
of circumstance, just as his own imitation of mind is. Wherever Mind arrives at the problem
of Life, it arrives at the two high symbols, Beauty and Passion. How can anyone distinguish
place or time between the Aphrodite of Melos and one of Rodin’s beautiful embracing
couples; between Shakespeare’s Cleopatra or Wagner’s Isolde music; between Sappho’s love
poetry or the golden sensuality of Titian; between Hugh McCrae and Catullus? Our common
understanding of Time and Space is here abolished. All these live in the same element of
Mind: but how can the academic understand that all these whom he considers dead are still
thousands of years ahead of him? In psychology, in a vague endeavour after freedom, he tries
to force the supreme importance on environment, thereby destroying any real conception
of true freedom. Here as before he is making the nature of his own mind apply to all mind
and is trying to depreciate that integral and essential element which is Self. All theories of
evolution that are based on the necessity of approximating the self to environment; veiled
as the racial consciousness or by some other fine name, are equally fallacious: the problem
is one of an expression that is in despite of, and that annihilates, all environment. We must
repeat again. Real mind is rare, but where it exists, it brings a knowledge of Life to Life that
earth could not have given it; its sensitiveness to emotion is greater than any possibility of
external stimulus; it brings a knowledge of Rhythm [sic] and Form to the material of earth that
utterly transcends that material, (Art is not selection); it brings an infinite desire that takes
Sex as the symbol for its continual effort to define its own essence in Form (for Form is Life,
and mind is in essence the thing it desires—the soul is all libido, as Jung says). Its cry is that
of Wagner: “All my life I have never truly tasted the happiness of love, therefore I will raise a
monument to a beautiful dream of it.” How beautiful and transcendent that dream was we
can find by listening to Tristan and Isolde, where in the final song it brings blood and life to
the stabbing-sweet passion of the life body of the woman, broken by sobs, in an unimaginable
crescendo of leaping desire. Surely the ecstasy of such music—Isolde’s Liebes-Tod, or the
shattering Bacchanalia of the Tannhauser Overture, or Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, that
reeling glory of drunken dance, or the boisterous swing of the Eighth, infinitely beyond any
expression on any instruments we possess, is enough to destroy all aesthetic complacence.
Is it that the academic is so utterly dead that he has not even a perception of the flagrant
divinity here? Incredible though it seems that is the only possible conclusion: for him music
is a brand of mathematics. Here Egyptianism reaches its apex.
And all the while the little imitative and perceptive egotism stands smiling by,
murmuring Hamlet's remark, “words, words, words.” And it is quite correct: for if there is
nothing here but words, the vaguest and windiest of nonsense; how could it see anything
else but exaggeration and pose in Beethoven’s words: "Do you believe that when I compose, 
I hear a divine violin.” For it exists by a rejection of humility: it says to itself—I know quite
well this is false; I am the proof of it myself; for I am a manufactured article: no one can deny
that. It is absolutely correct. We could spend centuries in vain trying to bring it to the smallest
perception of Spirit, of the innervitalityof Form, the subtle and indefinable content of passion
that transfigures and flames, the difference between Praxiteles and Phidias, Shakespeare and
Milton. It could never see it any more than a eunuch could guess the desirous essence of sex
about a passionate woman, in Hugh McCrae’s wonderful lines:
the floating bloom
Aerial flowers shed invisible
About the body of the splendid girl...
This article, for instance, if read by an academic (although it is inconceivable that
he would be interested enough to read, except out of tolerant curiosity, such unbalanced
generalities) would only rouse in him a mixture of pity and indifference, and, secure in his
castration, a serene and pleasing sense ofthe calm superiority of his logical brand, that seems
to him unprejudiced because it is completely prejudiced, to such apparently indefinite and
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unmeaning charges. But as we have already said, the only object ofthis article is an outlet for
our own contempt for this creature, and also perhaps to affirm revolution in some one else’s
awakening mind. Thought can give nothing: it can at the very most quicken development.
It is by a self-protective impulse that the dogmatism and scientific complacency
of the academic covers itself up from all understanding of the symbol of self. It prefers the
safety of facts to the lonely and dizzy road towards Truth, that curved beckoning horizon that
can never be reached. It is here that the scientist and Christian are one; for both take refuge
in narcotics and are equally rejected by the morality of Mind. Facts and Cod are the same
thing essentially, and any one who reposes his salvation in either represents the same sate of
mind; both are roads from self. This has been stated perfectly by Nietzsche, who points out
that the academic virtue is sleep, i.e., narcotisation. We may well end with some of the words
of this great regenerator who attacked with complete comprehension all Christian and other 
primitive forces, all that wanders from the path of real morality, the road to Self.—
A fool I consider that wise man there; but I believe that he well knoweth how to sleep.
Happy he who liveth near this wise man! Such a sleep is infectious, even through a thick
wall it is infectious.
A charm liveth even in his chair. Nor did the youths sit in vain before the preacher of
virtue.
His Wisdom is: to wake in order to sleep well. And verily, if life had no significance and
had I to choose nonsense, this nonsense would seem worthiest to be chosen.
And again addressing directly—
But folk ye remain for me ... folk with dim-sighted eyes—folk that know not what spirit
is.
Spirit is that life which itself cutteth into life."
Even if the whole of the above is wrong, it is far more right than anything the
academic could say—he who knows not life which itself cutteth into life, or that gaiety
“that leaps with both feet into golden-emerald rapture," the wickedness that is “a laughing
wickedness, feeling at home under rose-slopes and lily-hedges when ... all that is heavy
becomes light and all that is body becomes a dance, and all that is spirit becomes a bird."
These last swift gay phrases of Nietzsche create in antithesis, all that the academic is not.
'• Jack Lindsay (1900-90) studied Classics at the University of Queensland (BA Hons,
1921). He was a communist activist and prolific writer and translator.
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